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By John A. Humbach 
O U R  LAWS PROMISE us many rights, but 
the rights are only as good as the laws' 
implementation. And our legal system 
undoubtedly delivers far less than its 
literal promise. The recent American 
Bar Foundation survey, The Legal 
Needs of the Public (1977), shows that 
the probability a lawyer will be con- 
sulted for various problems is as low as 
12 per cent for serious problems with 
bureaucracy (nonbusiness related); 10 
per cent for serious consumer problems 
(including landlord-tenant); 5 per cent 
for serious property damage (nonbusi- 
ness related); and 1 per cent for job dis- 
crimination. Two of three Americans 
have consulted a lawyer only once in 
their lives or never at all. 
It is clear that there are many occa- 
sions when legal services would be use- 
ful but are not being provided. The 
question is what the legal profession 
can do and should be fairly expected to 
do about this. I 
First, what can the legal profession 
do about the massive differences in ac- 
cess to legal services? The answer, I am 
afraid, is not much. President Carter 
charged last year that 90 per cent of the 
lawyers represent only 10 per cent of 
the people (64 A.B.A.J. 840 (1978)). Our 
egalitarian ethic is appalled by these 
claims, but it is even more staggering to 
think of what would be involved in try- 
ing to provide all of the people with the 
legal services now enjoyed by the most 
favorably treated 10 per cent. We al- 
ready have more lawyers per capita 
than any other country. If we doubled 
our numbers immediately, the shortfall 
access do not show great inequality. In- 
stead, they show that most people get 
about the same level of legal 
services-a level that is very low. Evi- 
dently, people who have potential legal 
problems mostly manage to reach a res- 
olution by extralegal means. 
These extralegal resolutions may or 
may not be parallel to or imitative of the 
solutions lawyers would provide. But 
that is beside the point. Unless we are 
going to increase drastically the pro- 
portion of the work force engaged in 
law practice, we have to reconcile our- 
selves to this reality: we do not want 
the legal system to be capable of offer- 
ing all of the protection it may seem to 
promise. It will never redress every 
technical battery or defamatory slight. 
It will never wring every dollar due 
from the social welfare system. In fact, 
the entire range of supposed legal pro- 
tections is subject to the following rue- 
ful but real qualification: they are avail- 
able only if somebody, willingly or 
unwillingly, pays the cost of providing 
them. 
Why must this be? Why cannot the 
law's protection correspond fully to its 
promise? The answer is priorities. No- 
body wants to devote $500 blocks of 
lawyers' time to $15 problems. 
The use of lawyers by the middle 
class demonstrates the point. Except for 
a narrow range of property-related 
matters-conveyances, wills, and mari- 
tal separations - the middle class 
makes just about as little use of legal 
services as those who literally cannot 
afford them. Even prepaid legal insur- 
ance plans have proved surprisingly 
unpopular. Why? Because people do 
Mandatory pro bono publico legal services > 
is a misconceived idea. Its result could be 
a bonanza for the big firms. 
would still be massive. A little extra pro 
bono publico work by each lawyer 
(even, as has been proposed by the 
American Bar Association Special 
Committee on Public Interest Practice, Serving 
-r 
5 to 10 per cent of a lawyer's time) 
would hardly make a dent. To tout 
these schemes as a response to inequal- 
ity is pure public relations gimmickry. 
What can we make of this? The first Public 
thing is to avoid confusing lawyer jus- 
tice with social justice. The statistics 
show vast differences in access to legal 
services, but what about the general 
level of justice? 
For one thing, the statistics on lawyer 
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not want to give up what they would problem that could be handled legally, 
have to in order to buy a little more of then the world will never know social 
our lawyer justice, except when the ex- justice. 1 do not belleve, however, that 
pected benefit is worth the cost. the requirements of social justiceareso 
People's priorities are different. 
However, just because lawyers are 
expensive, it does not mean that lawyer 
justice is by and large reserved for the 
rich. With our almost unique contin- 
gent fee system, we are the most litigi- 
ous, that is, justice-seeking, society on 
Earth. Contingent fees permit just about 
any substantial legal claim to be pur- 
sued if getting the justice is worth the 
cost. The assertion of rights defensively 
is, of course, a different matter. Defense 
is primarily a matter of protecting 
property fro111 judicial execution. The 
stringent. 
So we cannot do much about the dis- 
tribution of legal services. But a ques- 
tion still remains. What should law- 
yers, dq a profession, fairly be expected 
to do in light of the maldistribution that 
exists? Just because we cannot do much 
does not mean we should simply do 
nothing. Not only as members of the 
justice profession, but as human be- 
ings, we should be sensitive to injus- 
tice. The pit of unfulfilled human need 
may be practically bottomless, but thls 
fact should be a stimulus, not a dis- 
cost of this protection (for most of us, couragement, to the generosity of our 
liability insurance) is part of the price charitable impulses. As professionals, 
of owning property. The problem of moreover, we are uniquely able to fill 
criminal defense is somewhat special, needs of a particular type-legal needs 
analogous to that of criminal prosecu- -and it should be part of our profes- 
tion. If there is going to be a criminal sional ethic, as well as the written 
justice system, there has to be some ethics, to help those who cannot pay. 
mechanism for determining who the But what about going beyond this? 
criminals are. Prosecution and defense What about mandatory pro bono pub- 
both are parts of the mechanism. The lico work - a legal requirement that 
social interest in identifying the crirni- lawyers must work 5 to 10 per cent of 
nals justifies the social burden of run- their time on a no-fee or low-fee basis, 
ning the basic epistomology. "quantifying" our pub l~c  interest re- 
This is not to say all is perfect. To be sponsibility, as ~t is euphemistically 
sure, a little more lawyer justice here called? These proposals are, I think, 
and there would even things up a bit so misconceived, unfair, and probably 
far as social justice is concerned. But counterproductive of their ostensible 
occasional miscarriages of justice do objectives Here is why 
not make for an "unjust society" unless The problem of inadequate legal 
we start mistaking ice cubes for the tips services to those who cannot pay 1s 
of icebergs. We c a ~ o t  become frenzied really only part of a much larger prob- 
just because there is not a lawyer to lem-poverty The poor not only do not 
solve every legal problem. If social jus- get enough legal services; they tend to 
tice requires legal services for every have inadequate shelter, not enough 
food, low-quality clothing, bad plumb- 
ing, less entertainment - in short, too 
little of just about everything. That is 
the definition of being poor. This raises 
two important questions. 
First, if the poor suffer deprivation of 
the all sorts, is an expanded supply of legal services what they really want? Or are their priorities more like those of the middle class? That is, given the choice, would they prefer that lawyers render their charitv in some other form? I sus- 
game, we should glve them not 5 or 10 
per cent of our time but 5 or 10 per cent n overstated of our incomes. With the money, the 
poor could buy our legal servlces if that 
is what they really want, or they could objective use ,he money br something - 
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whichever would make them happier. 
Merely to increase substantially the 
quantity of free legal services is largely 
to waste our time, if even the poor, 
given the value, would likely think it 
more worthwhile to spend it on some- 
thing else. 
The second question raised by man- 
datory pro bono publico schemes is one 
of fairness. Yes, there is a maldistribu- 
tion of legal services in our society. But 
since this is essentially a part of a much 
larger problem - the social problem of 
poverty - it is illogical to saddle one 
small group in soclety with a very bur- 
densome special tax. It makes about as 
much sense as taxing beauticians to 
save the whales. Mandatory pro bono 
publico would be nothing less than a 
tax-an excise tax levied on the prac- 
tice of the legal profession. Since the 
problem 1s general, so should be the so- 
lution The general tax bases should be 
resorted to for fairness, not to mentlon 
effectiveness 
A tax payable only in services, not 
commutable to a cash payment, would 
be particularly insidious in imposlng 
what would be in effect, and perhaps in 
law, an involuntary servitude. The Su- 
preme Court has not yet ruled whether 
that scheme would violate the letter of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, but surely 
lt would violate the amendment's 
spirit. And to assert glibly that a lawyer 
has no "right" to practice law, or can 
always glve up the profession, training, 
and experience, is more to demonstrate 
cynicism than constitutional validity. 
Then there is the Issue of compe- 
tency. What happens when a lot of se- 
curitles and patent lawyers are turned 
loose on the legal problems of the poor? 
My guess is that there might be a lot of 
malpractice. The legal problems of thc 
poor are not necessarily nnsophisti- 
cated or simple. Consumer law, land- 
lord-tenant, and social services are all 
specialties, and their mastery hardly 
can be accomplished by practicing 
them a couple of weeks a year. If we are 
going to help the poor, we should offer 
them more than the diminished en- 
thuslasm of forced labor or the seat-of- 
the-pants guesswork of high-minded 
poverty law dilettantes. They are enti- 
tled to lawyers who take their causes 
seriously and are able to handle them as 
serious cases. 
What intrigues me about mandatory 
pro bono publico work is the question 
of c u ~  bono-that is, who benefits? At 
first glance the obvious beneficiaries 
appear to be the poor But on reflection 
it is not so obvious they will benefit 
For example, suppose that lawyers, 
looking for ways to fill their quota, start 
impeding debt collection or complicat- 
ing evictions of. nonrent-paying ten- 
ants. The immediate result is to in- 
crease the fees to the lawyers of land- 
lords and merchants, thus increasing 
the costs of those suppliers. The 
longer-run effect is likely worse: to in- 
crease the price or decrease the supply 
of housing and credit to the poor. It is a 
great social Injustice that many .people 
cannot afford decent housing. It may be 
even more unjust that tenants can be 
evicted for failing to pay the rent on a 
tumble-down slum. But additional In- 
puts of lawyer justice are not likely to 
solve those social problems. Indeed, if 
the poor end up paying more to defend 
landlords and merchants, things may 
even get worse. 
The most intriguing cul bono aspect 
of mandatory pro bono schemes is the 
different effect they could have on law- 
yers in different klnds of practlce. 
Those in small firms and sole prac- 
titioners wlll be affected far more dras- 
tically than members of large firms. 
Sole practitioners 
would have trouble 
paying the "tax" 
First, lawyers who practlce alone or 
In small firms would be least able to 
avoid the full brunt of a mandatory pro 
bono publico "tax." Because these law- 
yers earn their llviilgs by selling only 
their own time, their options would be 
slight. Eithei they could devote less 
time to their paying clients and thereby 
reduce the11 in~omes ,  or they could 
give up tlme otherwise available for 
personal leisure, fanilly a~tivitles, and 
the llkc Or, of course, they could try 
some comblnatlon of more work and 
less pay. 
Another group of ldwyers iri~ludes 
employees of corporations, of govern- 
ment, or of firms owned by other ldw- 
yers. Mandatory pro bono publico may 
have divergent effects on thern. For 
example, a corporate or government 
lawyer might have to satisfy 5 per 
cent requircmcnt by donating two 
weeks of his varation to a p u b l i ~  inter- 
est law firm. Or, employer willing, the 
two work weeks could orcur during 
regular work time, in which case the 
lawyer wolild not be burdened much at 
all unless his salary were adjusted to 
reflect his redured productivity. The 
impact of a pro bono publico tax on this 
group could he heavy or light, depend- 
ing on whether employers allowed ~ t s  
burden to be shifted effectively to them. 
Lawyers who will least feel the bur- 
den are those whose business is to buy 
legal services wholesale and sell them 
at retail. These are, of course, the mem- 
bers of large law firms. Since big-firm 
partners do not make their money 
solely by selling their own time, they 
can much more reddily parry the time 
burdens of mandatory pro bono pub- 
lico. Already large-scale buyers and 
sellers of legal services, they simply 
can hire extra associates, let thein do 
pro bono publico work full time, and 
thereby satisfy the obligations of the 
firm. This "collective" approach to f~!- 
filling a firm's pro bono publico re- 
sponsibility has been endorsed by the 
principal proponents of mandatory pro 
bono publico work -the A.B.A. com- 
mittee And as a painless escape hatch 
for the highest-paid members of our 
profession, the "collective" responsi- 
bility approach hardly could be ex- 
celled. 
Indeed, members of large firms may 
even benefit - and not only from the 
implicit good public relations. There 
may be cash profits as well After all, 
most situations requiring legal services 
have two sides. Whenever clients who 
cannot pay get more legal services, 
clients who can pay need more legal 
services. This results in new business 
for the bar. Of course, this new business 
is little help to lawyers who sell only 
their own time. With their own pro 
bono publico duties, they would be 
hard put to take on additional work, 
even if it paid. 
But for the buyers and sellers of legal 
services, this new business could be a 
small bonanza. They could hire new 
associdles to do the work, pay them 
wholesale, and sell their tlme retail, 
and dn enlire new source of profits 
could be cxploited from the increased 
turnover of big-firm lawyers' stock in 
trade. 
What can we conclude about this 
misconceived idea of mandatory pro 
hono publico work for lawyers? At best, 
it is an exoression of the idealism of a 
profession dedicated to public service. 
4 t  worst, it is a public relations gim- 
mick, designed to deflect the suspicio~l 
that lawyers are basically a bulwark be- 
tween iustice and the elite. At bottom, 
however, it is neither of these. It is sim- 
ply an idea whose tir~ie should never 
come. A 
(John A. Humbach is a professor of 
law at Pace University, White Plains, 
New York.) 
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